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Appointing practicing scientists to corporate leadership boosts firms’ science-based patents and attracts top inventors; meanwhile, mission-oriented public science programs such as the BRAIN Initiative catalyse venture capital into neurotech by lowering technical uncertainty and supplying talent and complementary technologies.

Essays on Corporate Innovation and Commercializing Scientific Discovery
Yao, Yufeng · September 16, 2026 · UNSWorks (University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia)
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Active scientists in corporate leadership (Scientific Directors and Scientific Executives) materially improve firms' science-based innovation quality and inventor access, while mission-oriented public funding like the BRAIN Initiative increases VC financing, valuations, and exits for neurotech startups by reducing technical uncertainty and expanding scientific talent and complementary AI/data integration.

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Scientific research is fundamental to economic growth and social welfare. This thesis addresses two challenges in utilizing and commercializing scientific research: the growing gap between scientific research and corporate innovation and the financing friction science-based technology startups face. Chapter 1 examines the role of Scientific Directors (SciDs), defined as outside directors with scientific expertise, in bridging the gap between scientific research and patent development. We show that firms consistently produce better innovations when SciD significantly influences the firm's technology. Using the Large Language Model (LLM), we categorize patents based on the SciDs' areas of expertise. We further show that firms generate high-quality patents in fields where SciDs are actively in research. Besides, SciDs contribute to a firm’s innovation talents by tapping their professional networks of top-tier inventors. The Human Genome Project (HGP)'s impact on the corporate board is examined to address endogeneity concerns, observing an increased demand for SciDs in pharmaceutical firms post-HGP. Chapter 2 studies whether mission-oriented public funding, which supplies knowledge as a public good, fosters VC investments, using the BRAIN Initiative (BI) as an experiment. Following BI, there is an increase in VC investments in neurotech startups, with higher valuations and more successful exits. The results are attributed to reduced technical uncertainty, evidenced by three channels: an increased supply of skilled academic labor, more breakthrough innovations, and enhanced integration with complementary technologies like AI and big data, aligning with BI's data-driven objectives. The results suggest the supply of government-backed science and scientists can spur follow-on private investments in emerging technologies. Chapter 3 shows the impact of Scientific Executives (SciExecs), Chief Technology-related Officers with scientific publications, on enhancing corporate innovation quality and bridging gaps between research and development. Firms with SciExecs are linked to more science-based and government patents, which carry significant economic value. Patents citing SciExecs' publications are more valuable than other patents within the same firms, technology classes, and grant years. Post-BI, neurotech firms have an increased tendency to appoint SciExec. These neurotech firms with SciExecs produce better innovations than other neurotech firms without SciExecs.

Summary

Main Finding

Yufeng Yao (PhD thesis, UNSW Business School, Jan 2025) shows that embedding active scientists in corporate governance and executive roles and supplying mission-oriented public science both materially improve the commercialization of scientific discovery. Specifically: (1) Scientific Directors (SciDs) on boards and Scientific Executives (SciExecs) inside firms raise the quantity and economic quality of firm innovation—especially in technology areas where those scientists are research-active—and (2) mission-oriented basic-science funding (the BRAIN Initiative) reduced technical uncertainty and spurred follow-on venture-capital investment, higher valuations, and more successful exits for neurotech startups.

Citation: Yao, Y. (2025). Essays on Corporate Innovation and Commercializing Scientific Discovery. UNSW PhD thesis. DOI: https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/32688 (CC BY 4.0).

Key Points

  • SciDs (outside directors with scientific PhDs/publications) increase firms’ reliance on fundamental science and improve innovation quality (more breakthrough patents, more citations, higher-value patents) — effects concentrated in tech areas matching the SciD’s expertise.
  • SciDs operate through two main channels: (i) scientific knowledge transfer (firm patents increasingly cite the SciD’s area/publications) and (ii) professional networks (SciDs help firms access high-caliber inventors within scientific communities).
  • Endogeneity/addressing selection: results are supported using director×firm fixed-effects, an instrument based on local SciD supply, and a quasi-exogenous shock (Human Genome Project) that increased SciD demand in pharma.
  • Mission-oriented public funding (the U.S. BRAIN Initiative) raised VC activity in neurotech: more deals, larger funding rounds, higher valuations, and better exit outcomes. Mechanisms include greater supply of skilled academic labor, more breakthrough inventions, and improved integration of neurotech with complementary technologies (AI, big data).
  • SciExecs (CTO-like executives with publication records) are associated with more science-based and government-backed patents; patents citing SciExec publications are more valuable. Neurotech firms were more likely to appoint SciExecs after the BRAIN Initiative, and those firms produced better innovations.
  • Empirical measures of innovation: patent counts, breakthrough patents, forward citations, patent market-value proxies, and whether patents are classified as “fundamental” (science-sourced).
  • Robustness checks include alternative neurotech definitions, pre-trend tests, and exclusions (e.g., removing AI/big-data startups where relevant).

Data & Methods

  • Data sources: corporate board and executive data; patent datasets (patent texts, citations, classifications); scientific publication data; government grants (NIH/BRAIN Initiative) and award records; VC investment and exit databases; employee/inventor records and name-matching routines.
  • Machine learning / NLP:
    • SciBERT / BERT-style models to map and match patents to scientific subject areas and to classify whether patents derive from specific scientific domains.
    • Supervised classifiers for identifying neurotech startups and for assessing the commercial potential of scientific grants/papers.
  • Network / community methods:
    • Louvain algorithm and other community-detection techniques to construct scientific/professional communities and inventor networks around SciDs.
  • Identification strategies:
    • Within firm–SciD (director × firm) fixed-effects to capture time-varying influence of SciD appointments on firm patents.
    • Instrumental variables: local SciD supply used as an instrument for SciD appointment to address selection.
    • Event-study / difference-in-differences for the BRAIN Initiative (pre/post BI comparisons between neurotech and comparison healthcare sectors), with parallel-trend checks and multiple robustness specifications.
    • Human Genome Project treated as an exogenous shock increasing demand for SciDs in affected industries.
  • Outcome metrics:
    • Patent counts, fundamental-patent share, forward citations, breakthrough-patent indicators, patent value measures (market proxies), VC funding size and valuations, exit success (acquisitions/IPOs).

Implications for AI Economics

  • Scientific human capital matters for firm adoption and commercialization of frontier technologies. For firms seeking to commercialize AI-enhanced science (e.g., AI-driven drug discovery, neurotech coupled with ML), appointing SciDs and SciExecs can materially improve innovation outcomes and technology integration.
  • Mission-oriented public science funding (targeted R&D programs) can catalyze private investment in emerging AI–science hybrids by reducing early technical uncertainty and expanding the pool of scientifically trained labor ready to apply AI tools — a lever for policymakers to steer private capital into socially valuable, deep-technology areas.
  • VC markets respond to reductions in technical uncertainty: combining public funding signals and scientific talent increases private financing and valuations. For AI economics this implies that government backing of foundational datasets, benchmarks, and open scientific resources (analogous to the BRAIN Initiative’s data-driven priorities) can accelerate AI commercialization in scientific domains.
  • Methodological takeaway: LLMs and domain-specific transformers (e.g., SciBERT) are effective tools for mapping linkages between scientific research and patented commercialization — useful for researchers and policymakers monitoring AI’s diffusion across science-driven industries.
  • Corporate governance and executive composition are policy-relevant levers. As AI systems become central to scientific discovery, firms that integrate academic-scientist expertise into governance/executive roles are better positioned to capture value from science–AI complementarities.
  • Practical recommendations:
    • Firms commercializing science + AI should consider recruiting active scientists into decision-making roles (board or executive) to access frontier knowledge and networks.
    • Policymakers designing mission-oriented R&D should pair grant funding with programs that foster academia–industry mobility and data/compute infrastructure to maximize private follow-on investment.
    • VCs evaluating AI-for-science startups should weigh signals from government-funded science and academic co-founders/publications as indicators of reduced technical risk.

If you want, I can extract key tables/figures and produce a one-page visual summary (charts or bulletized evidence) for each chapter.

Assessment

Paper Typequasi_experimental Evidence Strengthhigh — The thesis combines large administrative datasets (patents, director biographies/publications, VC/startup funding, grant data) with rigorous quasi-experimental designs (IV, event-study, DiD, firm×director FE) and multiple robustness and mechanism tests (professional network analysis, inventor flows, valuation and exit outcomes), which together provide credible causal evidence even though no randomized experiment is available. Methods Rigorhigh — Careful construction and linkage of heterogeneous data sources, use of SciBERT/LLM to classify patent–science links, network/community detection (Louvain), well-specified fixed-effects models, multiple quasi-experimental identification strategies (local supply IV, HGP shock, DiD for BI), pre-trend checks and robustness analyses; remaining concerns are the usual assumptions for IV/DiD and potential measurement error in LLM classification which the author addresses with validation exercises. SampleMultiple linked samples: (a) publicly listed firms with board membership data matched to scientists (SciDs) via publication records and CVs; firm patent portfolios from USPTO (patent counts, citations, grant-year, technology classes) with LLM (SciBERT) classification mapping patents to scientists' expertise and fundamental-science patents; (b) VC-backed startup dataset (PitchBook/Crunchbase-like) covering neurotech and other healthcare startups, with funding rounds, valuations and exits; (c) grant-level data for the BRAIN Initiative (BI) and non-BI grants (NIH/NSF) to identify treated research supply; (d) inventor-level data to track flows into firms/startups and professional networks; time period spans roughly 2000s–2020s (pre/post BI and HGP-era analyses). Themesinnovation org_design IdentificationMultiple quasi-experimental strategies: (1) within firm×director (director×firm) fixed-effects to capture time-series variation after SciD appointment and link patents to SciDs via patent-to-publication citations and LLM-based topic matching; (2) IV using local Scientific Director (local SciD) supply to instrument for SciD appointment; (3) event-study / natural experiment around the Human Genome Project (HGP) as an exogenous shock increasing demand for SciDs in pharma to address endogeneity of appointments; (4) difference-in-differences comparing neurotech startups to other healthcare startups before and after the BRAIN Initiative (BI), with parallel-trend tests and robustness checks; (5) matching, placebo tests, and multiple robustness specifications (alternative neuro definitions, excluding AI/big-data firms) to probe mechanisms. GeneralizabilityMostly focused on US-based (or US-dominated) institutions, firms, and grant programs — findings may not directly generalize to other countries with different board norms and funding landscapes., Industry focus is heavy on pharmaceuticals, neurotech, and science-based firms; patterns may differ in pure-software or non-science-intensive sectors., Analyses emphasize firms and VC-backed startups that patent or interact with academic science; results may not apply to non-patenting innovators or informal technology adoption., Dependence on LLM-based classification and name-matching introduces measurement error that could be context-dependent., Temporal context: results reflect institutional arrangements and VC behavior over the study period and could change with evolving financing models or governance norms.

Claims (11)

ClaimDirectionOutcomeConfidence & EvidenceDetails
Firms produce higher-quality innovations when Scientific Directors (SciDs)—outside directors with scientific expertise—significantly influence the firm's technology. Innovation Output positive Corporate innovation quality
Reading fidelity high
Study strength medium
not reported
0.48
Firms generate higher-quality patents in technological fields where their Scientific Directors are research-active. Output Quality positive Patent quality
Reading fidelity high
Study strength medium
not reported
0.48
Scientific Directors contribute to firms' innovation talent by drawing on their professional networks of top-tier inventors. Innovation Output positive Access to and productivity of innovation talent
Reading fidelity high
Study strength medium
not reported
0.48
The Human Genome Project increased pharmaceutical firms' demand for Scientific Directors. Hiring positive Appointment or demand for Scientific Directors
Reading fidelity high
Study strength medium
not reported
0.48
Following the BRAIN Initiative, venture-capital investment in neurotechnology startups increased. Firm Revenue positive VC investment and financing
Reading fidelity high
Study strength medium
not reported
0.48
After the BRAIN Initiative, neurotechnology startups had higher valuations and more successful exits. Firm Revenue positive Startup valuation and exit success
Reading fidelity high
Study strength medium
not reported
0.48
The BRAIN Initiative's effect on private investment is associated with an increased supply of skilled academic labor, more breakthrough innovations, and stronger integration with complementary technologies such as AI and big data. Adoption Rate positive Mechanisms linking public science funding to private investment
Reading fidelity high
Study strength medium
not reported
0.48
Firms with Scientific Executives (SciExecs)—chief technology-related officers with scientific publications—produce more science-based and government patents. Innovation Output positive Science-based and government patent production
Reading fidelity high
Study strength medium
not reported
0.48
Patents that cite a SciExec's scientific publications are more valuable than other patents within the same firm, technology class, and grant year. Innovation Output positive Economic value of patents
Reading fidelity high
Study strength medium
not reported
0.48
The share of scientific research expenses in total U.S. corporate R&D declined from 38.26% in 1955 to below 20% in recent years. Firm Productivity negative Corporate scientific research intensity
Reading fidelity high
Study strength low
declined from 38.26% to below 20%
0.24
Among venture-capital-backed startups, the share of software startups increased from 30% in 2002 to 36% in 2020, while the share of other patenting startups fell from 25% to 6%. Market Structure mixed Industry composition of VC-backed startups
Reading fidelity high
Study strength low
software: 30% to 36%; other patenting startups: 25% to 6%
0.24

Notes