A clash between a traditional, law-centered international order and a looser, politically interpretive rules-based order is reshaping who gets to set global rules — including for AI; weakened multilateral institutions and multipolarity increase uncertainty for firms while offering smaller states tactical legal avenues to influence outcomes.

Main Finding

The article argues that contemporary contestation over global order hinges on a clash between an international law-based order (ILBO) — grounded in sources doctrine, the UN Charter, and legal interpretive methods — and a broader, politically interpretative rules-based order (RBO). Post-2008 polycrises and growing multipolarity have weakened the institutional effectiveness of the liberal international order, reopened debates over what counts as legitimate legality, and made strategic legalism — using international law relationally — a viable tool for smaller states to manage power asymmetries.

Key Points

• Distinction: ILBO is law-centered (sources, Charter, interpretive method); RBO is politically broader and more interpretative, often invoking norms and standards beyond traditional legal sources.
• Causes of contestation: Post-2008 polycrises and multipolarisation have eroded the liberal international order’s institutions and authority, creating space for competing frames of legitimacy.
• Analytical criteria: Comparison between ILBO and RBO is organized around three axes — normative structure (what norms count and how they are justified), institutional infrastructure (which organizations and procedural mechanisms sustain the order), and enforcement (how compliance is induced or coerced).
• Legal politics: Drawing on Critical Legal Studies, the article treats international law as a field of political struggle where legal rules and methods are themselves stakes in contestation over power and legitimacy.
• State strategies: The article develops a comparative typology of state responses (variations in commitment, instrumental use, or contestation of ILBO/RBO) and highlights how smaller states can pursue “strategic legalism” — using legal claims, procedures, and alliances to offset material power imbalances.
• Normative stakes: The question is not only which rules govern, but who gets to define legal legitimacy and how interpretive authority is allocated across institutions and actors.

Data & Methods

• Conceptual and doctrinal analysis: The paper analyzes sources doctrine, Charter provisions, and interpretative methods to delineate ILBO, and contrasts these with RBO’s looser normative claims.
• Comparative framework: Uses three explicit criteria (normative structure, institutional infrastructure, enforcement mechanisms) to structure the comparison between ILBO and RBO.
• Typology development: Constructs a comparative typology of state strategies toward the two orders, drawing illustrative cases or patterns (the summary did not list specific cases).
• Critical Legal Studies lens: Employs CLS to interpret international law as contested terrain — focusing on how legal forms and arguments function politically rather than neutrally.
• Normative-theoretical approach: The paper is primarily theoretical and interpretive rather than empirical in the sense of large-scale quantitative data.

Implications for AI Economics

• Governance regimes and rules framing: Whether AI governance follows an ILBO or an RBO frame will shape what counts as binding obligations versus aspirational rules, affecting regulatory certainty for AI firms and cross-border investment.
• Institutional effectiveness and standards diffusion: Weakened multilateral institutions (post-2008 trends) make global coordination on AI standards harder; fragmented governance raises compliance costs and may enable regulatory arbitrage, affecting comparative advantages across countries and firms.
• Enforcement and market incentives: An ILBO-like regime with clearer legal obligations and dispute mechanisms could reduce uncertainty for firms and foster predictable markets; an RBO-like regime relying on political commitments and soft rules may produce patchy enforcement and uneven market conditions.
• Small states’ leverage: Strategic legalism offers a template for smaller or less powerful states to influence AI economic outcomes by using legal claims, treaty mechanisms, or forum-shopping to protect data sovereignty, secure market access, or resist techno-economic coercion by large powers.
• Multipolarity and supply chains: Multipolarisation implies competing regulatory blocs and standards (e.g., differing approaches to data, privacy, export controls), increasing friction in AI supply chains and influencing location decisions for R&D and production.
• Competition policy and power asymmetries: Legal framings determine the tools available to check dominant AI platforms (antitrust, trade remedies, contractual law). The political-legal contest affects whether enforcement tools are robust and impartial or subject to geopolitical bias.
• Policy takeaway for economists and policymakers: Assess both the legal character of international AI rules (binding vs. normative) and the institutional capacity for enforcement. Design domestic policies and international strategies (alliances, treaty proposals, use of dispute settlement) that anticipate fragmented order dynamics and exploit legal mechanisms strategically to protect economic interests.