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Omniscalers — firms that scale AI infrastructure and services across markets — are centralizing power and creating a new, multi-level digital inequality by turning control of semiconductors, cloud, and AI foundations into transferable competitive advantage.

OMNISCALER AND NEW TECHNOLOGICAL RACES: DIGITAL INEQUALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSFORMING GLOBAL COMPETITION
Kyrylo Oliinyk, Volodymyr Panchenko · April 09, 2026 · Economic scope
openalex theoretical n/a evidence 7/10 relevance DOI Source PDF
The paper argues that 'omniscalers'—firms that scale infrastructural capabilities (semiconductors, cloud, AI software) across multiple arenas—create a new form of digital inequality by translating infrastructural control into transferable competitive advantages across firms, sectors, and countries.

The purpose of the study is to identify the role of omniscalers in new technological races and to explain how their ability to scale infrastructural, financial, innovation, and data advantages across multiple arenas generates new mechanisms of digital inequality under the transformation of global rivalry. The article argues that contemporary competition is shifting from rivalry over individual markets toward control over scaling infrastructures that enable data processing, computing capacity, digital integration, and the diffusion of new business models. In this context, omniscalers emerge as a new type of corporate actor capable of transferring accumulated advantages across several arenas of competition simultaneously. The study combines approaches to digital development, technological races, arenas of competition, the AI foundation, and digital inequality, and relies on structural-logical analysis, comparative method, systematization, and theoretical generalization. It distinguishes between technological competition, technological rivalry, and technological races, showing that digital inequality evolves from asymmetry in access to knowledge, infrastructure, and digital markets to inequality in control over critical technological nodes and, ultimately, to inequality in the ability to scale advantages across several high-dynamics arenas.The article demonstrates that arenas of competition function as interconnected structural nodes of the contemporary economy, while the AI foundation - combining semiconductors, cloud services, and AI software and services - serves as the core platform of current technological races. Omniscalers are conceptualized as actors that scale not a single product, but an infrastructural capability reusable across multiple technological and market environments, thereby generating cumulative self-reinforcing effects. The study proves that digital inequality increasingly concerns access to scaling infrastructures rather than only formal access to technologies, and that it manifests itself at the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels as asymmetry between firms, sectors, countries, and regions. The scientific novelty lies in interpreting omniscalers as structural actors of a new phase of technological races, refining the understanding of digital inequality as inequality of access, control, and scaling, and advancing the proposition that arenas of competition are key structural nodes of contemporary global transformations.

Summary

Main Finding

Omniscalers—firms that scale infrastructural capabilities (compute, data, cloud, semiconductors, AI models, R&D and financing) across multiple “arenas of competition”—are central actors in a new phase of technological races. Competition has shifted from sectoral market shares to control over scaling infrastructures (the “AI foundation”), and digital inequality now manifests less as formal access to technology and more as unequal access, control, and ability to scale infrastructural advantages across firms, sectors and countries.

Citation: Oliinyk K.D., Panchenko V.H. (2026). OMNISCALER AND NEW TECHNOLOGICAL RACES: DIGITAL INEQUALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSFORMING GLOBAL COMPETITION. Economic space, №211, pp. 326–334. DOI: https://doi.org/10.30838/EP.211.326-334

Key Points

  • Conceptual taxonomy: distinguishes three evolutionary forms of technological interaction
    • Technological competition: innovation- and resource-based; inequality = access to knowledge, R&D, skilled labour.
    • Technological rivalry: control over critical competencies, standards, production/supply nodes; inequality = control over access conditions.
    • Technological races: rapid cross‑arena scaling of advantages; inequality = ability to scale infrastructure across high‑dynamics arenas.
  • Arenas of competition: high-growth, high‑dynamism segments (interconnected infrastructural nodes) where new centres of economic power form and redistribute value and investment.
  • AI foundation: semiconductors, cloud services, AI software/services form the infrastructural core enabling cross‑sector diffusion (robotics, autonomous transport, biotech, defence, etc.).
  • Omniscalers defined: actors that scale reusable infrastructural capabilities (not just single products) across multiple technological and market environments, producing cumulative, self‑reinforcing advantages.
  • Digital inequality reframed: moves from a digital divide (access) to multi‑level asymmetries (micro/meso/macro) in access, control, and capacity to scale infrastructural advantages.
  • Systemic effects: control of infrastructure reshapes adjacent sectors and global value chains; infrastructure competition becomes a primary locus of power accumulation.

Data & Methods

  • Type of study: theoretical/analytical synthesis (no new empirical dataset).
  • Methods employed:
    • Structural‑logical analysis: to relate digital development, technological races, arenas, AI infrastructure, and inequality.
    • Comparative method: to differentiate competition / rivalry / races and compare inequality manifestations.
    • Systems approach: to treat digital inequality as multi‑level (firm, sector, country, region).
    • Systematization and theoretical generalization: to organize literature and derive conceptual conclusions.
  • Literature basis: integrates contemporary work on platform economy, AI, semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, digital transformation, and studies on digital inequality and global rivalry.

Implications for AI Economics

  • Market structure and rents:
    • Economic rents will increasingly accrue to owners/controllers of scaling infrastructure (compute, data, chip supply, large models), shifting surplus away from downstream firms that lack such infrastructure.
    • Standard models of competition that focus on single‑product markets may understate concentration and cross‑arena market power; models should incorporate reusable infrastructure and multi‑arena spillovers.
  • Barriers to entry and innovation diffusion:
    • High fixed costs and scale advantages in infrastructure create stronger barriers to entry and lock‑in effects; diffusion of AI capabilities will be mediated by access to omniscaler infrastructures.
    • Policy and industrial strategy matter more: access to compute, data and chips becomes a strategic input for national AI capability.
  • Policy and regulation:
    • Antitrust and competition policy need to account for cross‑arena infrastructural leverage (not only platform market shares) and cumulative scaling effects.
    • Industrial policy and public investment in compute, data governance, and chip capacity can be critical levers to mitigate digital inequality.
    • Data governance and interoperability standards may alter the degree to which omniscalers can transfer advantages across arenas.
  • Measurement and empirical work:
    • Empirical AI economics should measure “scaling infrastructure” (e.g., exascale compute capacity, data holdings, cloud market reach, chip fabrication access) as key explanatory variables for market outcomes and inequality.
    • Micro‑, meso‑ and macro‑level indicators of control vs. access (e.g., share of compute rented vs. owned; dependence on a small set of providers) would improve analyses of concentration and diffusion.
  • Research agenda:
    • Model multi‑arena strategic interactions where investment in shared infrastructure yields cross‑sector payoffs.
    • Quantify how infrastructure concentration affects social welfare, innovation rates, and international inequality.
    • Study policy designs (public clouds, subsidized chip fabs, interoperability mandates) that change incentives for omniscaler dominance.

Brief note on novelty: The paper’s main contribution is framing “omniscalers” as structural actors in modern technological races and reframing digital inequality as inequality of access, control, and scaling of infrastructural advantages—shifts that have direct consequences for economic modeling, policy, and empirical measurement in AI economics.

Assessment

Paper Typetheoretical Evidence Strengthn/a — The paper is conceptual/theoretical and does not present empirical tests or causal estimates; claims are supported by logical argumentation and literature synthesis rather than primary data or identification strategies. Methods Rigormedium — Uses systematic structural-logical analysis, comparative methods, and theoretical generalization to integrate literatures on digital development, technological races, and inequality, which is appropriate for theory-building; however, it lacks empirical validation, formal modelling, or pre-registered case selection that would raise rigor to high. SampleNo empirical sample; a conceptual synthesis drawing on existing literatures (digital development, technological races, AI foundations, digital inequality) and comparative/logical analysis of illustrative cases and arenas rather than systematic primary data or datasets. Themesinequality innovation governance GeneralizabilityNo empirical verification: propositions are not tested on representative firm, sector, or country data., Operational definitions (e.g., 'omniscaler', 'arenas of competition', 'AI foundation') may be context-sensitive and require empirical operationalization., May not generalize across industries with different capital, regulatory, or data architectures (e.g., manufacturing vs. digital services)., Time-bound: claims reflect contemporary AI/ cloud/semiconductor structure and may change as technology or policy evolves., Potential geopolitical variation: dynamics may differ across national institutional environments and regulatory regimes.

Claims (9)

ClaimDirectionConfidenceOutcomeDetails
Contemporary competition is shifting from rivalry over individual markets toward control over scaling infrastructures that enable data processing, computing capacity, digital integration, and the diffusion of new business models. Market Structure positive high control over scaling infrastructures (data processing, computing capacity, digital integration, business model diffusion)
0.02
Omniscalers emerge as a new type of corporate actor capable of transferring accumulated infrastructural, financial, innovation, and data advantages across several arenas of competition simultaneously. Market Structure positive high ability to transfer accumulated advantages across multiple arenas
0.02
Omniscalers scale infrastructural capabilities that are reusable across multiple technological and market environments, thereby generating cumulative self-reinforcing effects. Market Structure positive high generation of cumulative self-reinforcing effects from reusable infrastructural capabilities
0.02
Digital inequality increasingly concerns access to scaling infrastructures (control over critical nodes) rather than only formal access to technologies. Inequality positive high relative access and control over scaling infrastructures
0.02
Digital inequality manifests at micro-, meso-, and macro-levels as asymmetry between firms, sectors, countries, and regions. Inequality positive high asymmetry in access/control across firms, sectors, countries, regions
0.02
The 'AI foundation'—semiconductors, cloud services, and AI software and services—serves as the core platform of current technological races. Innovation Output positive high role of semiconductors, cloud services, and AI software as core platform enabling technological races
0.02
Digital inequality evolves from asymmetry in access to knowledge, infrastructure, and digital markets toward inequality in control over critical technological nodes and the ability to scale advantages across several high-dynamics arenas. Inequality positive high evolutionary shift in the nature of digital inequality (from access to control/scale)
0.02
Arenas of competition function as interconnected structural nodes of the contemporary economy, and recognizing them is key to understanding global transformations driven by digital and AI-related competition. Market Structure positive high interconnectedness and structural centrality of competition arenas in the economy
0.02
The scientific novelty of the work is to interpret omniscalers as structural actors of a new phase of technological races and to refine the concept of digital inequality as inequality of access, control, and scaling. Other positive high conceptual reframing of omniscalers and digital inequality
0.02

Notes