A Sino‑Russian 'semi‑core' offers an epistemological as well as geopolitical challenge to Western order, elevating technical AI workers from technicians to strategic actors; their position between competing infrastructures gives them unique leverage to influence the direction of the current global interregnum.

Theorising the Interregnum:

Stephen Wilkinson · April 04, 2026 · Journal of World-Systems Research

openalex theoretical low evidence 7/10 relevance DOI Source PDF

Arguing from World-Systems theory and contemporary philosophy, the paper contends that a Sino‑Russian 'semi-core' presents an epistemologically distinct challenge to Western hegemony and that technical AI workers—positioned between competing infrastructures and visions—could be pivotal actors in shaping systemic outcomes.

This article examines the current geopolitical and economic interregnum through the lens of World-Systems theory, focusing on what Ege Demirel (2024) identifies as the emergence of a “semi-core,” represented most prominently by China and Russia. Drawing on recent philosophical work by Zygmunt Bauman, empirical evidence from China's 'Global Community of Shared Future' white paper and Putin's 2024 Valdai address, alongside theoretical insights from contemporary Chinese Marxism, it argues that the semi-core's challenge to Western hegemony creates unique conditions for systemic transformation. Particular attention is given to the role of technical workers, whose strategic position at the intersection of competing infrastructural systems and alternative visions of global order makes them potentially crucial actors in determining the outcome of the current interregnum. By examining the philosophical foundations of Chinese Marxism—particularly its dialectical approach rooted in the yin-yang principle—the article reveals that the semi-core challenge represents not merely alternative policies but an alternative epistemology that fundamentally differs from Western either/or logic. Drawing on research by Muldoon, Graham, and Cant (2024) on the hidden labor supporting AI systems and the geopolitical competition over digital infrastructure, the article demonstrates how technical workers' potential for progressive transformation lies not just in their strategic importance and specialized knowledge but in their ability to build solidarity across the broader ecosystem of AI labor while between otherwise incommensurable philosophical and infrastructural systems.

Summary

Main Finding

The article argues that the emergence of a Sino-Russian "semi-core" and its alternative epistemology (an “and”/yin‑yang dialectic rather than Western either/or logic) reshape the geopolitical economy of AI. This creates new infrastructure, financial, and institutional fault lines in which technical workers occupy a strategically pivotal position: their labor (including hidden data‑work), skills, and potential cross‑system solidarities can materially influence whether the interregnum results in a more repressive techno‑authoritarian order, a China‑centred capitalist bloc, a more redistributive/socialist world‑system, or prolonged anarchy.

Key Points

Semi‑core concept: Unlike classic semi‑periphery states, China and Russia combine core capabilities (military, technological, institutional autonomy) with alternative visions of global order, producing an “anomaly” that could reorganize value capture and governance of digital/AI infrastructure.
Infrastructure as extraction: Hyperscale data centers and digital infrastructure concentrate energy use and value‑extraction (Muldoon, Graham & Cant 2024). These facilities act as an “extraction machine” that centralizes rents in infrastructure owners.
Outsourcing and hidden labor: AI development depends on outsourced, often precarious data‑labeling and training labor in peripheral countries, embedding new neocolonial extraction into AI value chains.
State‑led technological ascent: China’s neo‑Listian industrial strategy, BRI infrastructure, and BRICS financial tools (NDB, CRA, mBridge) are creating alternative trade, payments, and digital architectures that reduce dependence on US‑dominated systems (SWIFT, dollar settlement).
Epistemological divergence: Chinese Marxism’s dialectical “and” logic (yin‑yang, complementarity) informs institutional designs (e.g., equal shares in NDB, integrative organizations) and foreign policy rhetoric (Shared Community of Mankind). This differs from Western zero‑sum assumptions and may lead to different AI governance styles (integration, multi‑path coexistence).
Role of technical workers: Situated at the interface of competing infrastructures and governance systems, technical workers (engineers, data labelers, operators) have unique leverage — through mobility, bargaining, knowledge transfer, and potential cross‑ecosystem organizing — to influence direction of AI development and distribution of rents.

Data & Methods

Primary documents: China’s 2023 white paper "A Global Community of Shared Future"; Putin’s 2024 Valdai address.
Secondary/analytic sources: World‑systems theory (Wallerstein, Arrighi), Demirel on the semi‑core (2024), Bauman’s sociological perspectives, scholarship on Sinicized Marxism (Mahoney 2024; Cheng & Yang 2025).
Empirical citations: Studies on digital infrastructure and energy/use patterns (Muldoon, Graham & Cant 2024); examples of institutional innovation (NDB, CRA, mBridge).
Methodology: Qualitative, theoretical, and interpretive synthesis — combining geopolitical/institutional analysis with philosophical reading (epistemology of Chinese Marxism) and labor‑centric accounts of AI value chains.
Limitations: Non‑quantitative, speculative about future systemic trajectories; relies on interpretive reading of political documents and contemporary scholarship rather than original primary economic datasets.

Implications for AI Economics

Value capture and rents: Control of hyperscale infrastructure and alternative payments/financial architectures could shift where and how AI rents are captured (from US tech firms to semi‑core states, infrastructure owners, or new multilateral funds).
Global labor markets: Continued outsourcing of data training to the Global South risks deepening rent extraction; conversely, rising technical capacity in China and semi‑core states can re‑localize value‑added AI production and reduce peripheral wage capture.
Energy and cost structures: Concentrated energy demand of data centers creates strategic bottlenecks and input cost differentials that will shape comparative advantage in AI production and deployment.
Multipolar standards and fragmentation: Divergent epistemologies and institutional architectures (Western regulatory models vs. semi‑core integration) increase the likelihood of bifurcated technical standards, interoperability regimes, and compliance costs — affecting economies of scale and cross‑border AI markets.
Bargaining power of technical workers: Technical workers’ positionality gives them leverage to:
- Influence governance choices through cross‑platform mobility and transnational solidarity (potential to organize across competing ecosystems).
- Slow or redirect development by withholding or reshaping specialized labor (data curation, model fine‑tuning).
- Transfer tacit knowledge between competing systems, lowering switching costs and facilitating plural supply chains.
Policy and strategic considerations:
- For governments and multilateral actors: invest in decentralized, resilient infrastructure in the Global South, support fair pay and labour protections for AI data work, and account for energy/ carbon constraints in AI policy.
- For firms and investors: anticipate geopolitical fragmentation; hedge by diversifying infrastructure and compliance strategies; factor in the rising bargaining power and localization of technical talent.
- For labour/advocacy groups: target organizing around transnational data‑work platforms and infrastructure operators; leverage semi‑core vs. core competition to negotiate better terms.
Research priorities: quantify extraction flows along AI value chains; map energy and infrastructure concentration; empirically study technical workers’ mobility and collective capacity across geopolitical blocs; model economic impacts of multipolar payment systems on AI service pricing.

Overall, the paper frames AI economics as inseparable from geopolitical institutional change: who controls infrastructure, finance, and the epistemic frames that govern "how to design and deploy AI" will determine distributional outcomes, and technical workers are a potentially decisive actor in that contest.

Assessment

Paper Typetheoretical Evidence Strengthlow — The paper is primarily theoretical and interpretive, relying on selective textual analysis (policy white papers, speeches, philosophical texts) and secondary literature rather than systematic empirical or causal evidence; claims about causal effects or worker agency are conjectural and not tested empirically. Methods Rigormedium — The argument demonstrates rigorous engagement with multiple theoretical traditions and relevant primary sources (e.g., Bauman, Chinese policy texts, Valdai address) and recent literature on AI labor, but it does not apply systematic empirical methods, pre-registered hypotheses, or robust causal identification techniques. SampleQualitative corpus consisting of theoretical and philosophical texts (Zygmunt Bauman, contemporary Chinese Marxist writings), Chinese 'Global Community of Shared Future' white paper, Putin's 2024 Valdai address, and recent scholarly work on AI hidden labor and digital infrastructure (e.g., Muldoon, Graham, Cant 2024); no original quantitative dataset or representative surveys. Themesgovernance labor_markets human_ai_collab GeneralizabilityFocuses on China and Russia as a 'semi-core' — findings may not generalize to other states or regions, Relies on elite rhetoric and official documents which may not reflect on-the-ground practices, Theoretical synthesis may not map onto micro-level behavior of technical workers across diverse firms and sectors, Time-bound to 2024 geopolitical context; dynamics may change rapidly with technological or political shifts, Lacks systematic empirical validation, limiting applicability to policy prescriptions or causal claims

Claims (6)

Claim	Direction	Confidence	Outcome	Details
The emergence of a 'semi-core' is represented most prominently by China and Russia. Governance And Regulation	positive	high	emergence of a semi-core led by China and Russia	0.12
The semi-core's challenge to Western hegemony creates unique conditions for systemic transformation. Governance And Regulation	positive	high	potential for systemic transformation arising from semi‑core challenge	0.02
Technical workers occupy a strategic position at the intersection of competing infrastructural systems and alternative visions of global order, making them potentially crucial actors in determining the outcome of the current interregnum. Innovation Output	positive	high	technical workers' strategic influence over geopolitical/technical outcomes	0.12
Technical workers' potential for progressive transformation lies not just in their strategic importance and specialized knowledge but in their ability to build solidarity across the broader ecosystem of AI labour while operating between otherwise incommensurable philosophical and infrastructural systems. Governance And Regulation	positive	high	capacity for progressive transformation via worker solidarity in AI labour ecosystem	0.02
Chinese Marxism's dialectical approach—rooted in the yin‑yang principle—constitutes an alternative epistemology that fundamentally differs from Western either/or logic, and this epistemology underpins the semi‑core's policy and strategic stance. Governance And Regulation	mixed	high	epistemological orientation (yin‑yang dialectic vs Western either/or)	0.12
China's 'Global Community of Shared Future' white paper and Putin's 2024 Valdai address provide empirical evidence for an articulated alternative vision to the Western‑led global order. Governance And Regulation	positive	high	existence of articulated alternative geopolitical vision in official documents	0.12