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Agentic AI makes alignment an ongoing organizational cost: systems that generate open-ended actions, novel outputs, and evolving goals turn coordination into a continuous process of projection, monitoring and renegotiation rather than a one-off specification task; firms that can cheaply sustain persistent alignment gain a competitive edge.

Visioning Human-Agentic AI Teaming: Continuity, Tension, and Future Research
Bowen Lou, Tian Lu, T. S. Raghu, Yingjie Zhang · March 05, 2026 · ArXiv.org
openalex theoretical n/a evidence 8/10 relevance Source PDF
Agentic AI transforms alignment into a continuous, dynamic coordination problem by generating evolving trajectories, representations, and objectives that undermine assumptions of stable shared situation awareness and require ongoing re-alignment, monitoring, and institutional design.

Artificial intelligence is undergoing a structural transformation marked by the rise of agentic systems capable of open-ended action trajectories, generative representations and outputs, and evolving objectives. These properties introduce structural uncertainty into human-AI teaming (HAT), including uncertainty about behavior trajectories, epistemic grounding, and the stability of governing logics over time. Under such conditions, alignment cannot be secured through agreement on bounded outputs; it must be continuously sustained as plans unfold and priorities shift. We advance Team Situation Awareness (Team SA) theory, grounded in shared perception, comprehension, and projection, as an integrative anchor for this transition. While Team SA remains analytically foundational, its stabilizing logic presumes that shared awareness, once achieved, will support coordinated action through iterative updating. Agentic AI challenges this presumption. Our argument unfolds in two stages: first, we extend Team SA to reconceptualize both human and AI awareness under open-ended agency, including the sensemaking of projection congruence across heterogeneous systems. Second, we interrogate whether the dynamic processes traditionally assumed to stabilize teaming in relational interaction, cognitive learning, and coordination and control continue to function under adaptive autonomy. By distinguishing continuity from tension, we clarify where foundational insights hold and where structural uncertainty introduces strain, and articulate a forward-looking research agenda for HAT. The central challenge of HAT is not whether humans and AI can agree in the moment, but whether they can remain aligned as futures are continuously generated, revised, enacted, and governed over time.

Summary

Main Finding

Agentic AI — systems that plan, act, and revise goals over extended horizons — introduces structural uncertainty across action trajectories, generated representations, and governing regimes. Extending Team Situation Awareness (Team SA) to human–agentic AI teaming shows that while Team SA remains a useful integrative anchor, its stabilizing assumptions are strained. Under open-ended agency, processes that normally sustain alignment (relational interaction, iterative learning, coordination/control) can fail or reverse: legitimacy can rest on epistemic fragility, iterative updating can amplify divergence, and apparent shared awareness can coexist with substantive loss of oversight. The central problem becomes sustaining alignment over time as agents continuously generate, revise, enact, and govern futures.

Key Points

  • Definition of agentic AI and the three forms of structural uncertainty:
    • Trajectory uncertainty — open-ended multi-step action selection and replanning that unfolds during execution.
    • Epistemic uncertainty — generative outputs (rationales, facts, artifacts) whose grounding and evidentiary status are contestable.
    • Regime uncertainty — non-stationary governing configurations (objectives, constraints, capabilities) that can change across episodes.
  • Reciprocal modeling: agentic AI actively models human collaborators (preferences, likely responses) creating recursive dynamics that condition trajectories, outputs, and regime evolution.
  • Why classic assumptions break:
    • Traditional Team SA assumes boundedness and relative stationarity so iterative updates converge; agentic AI violates those assumptions.
    • Social norms and institutional accountability that constrain human teammates are weaker or absent for agentic systems, producing different coordination dynamics.
  • Team SA as integrative anchor:
    • Maps existing HAT theory families (evaluative attitudes, relational interaction, cognitive learning, explanatory guidance, collective coordination, operational control) onto SA levels (perception, comprehension, projection).
    • Reveals where each theory helps and where it leaves gaps under open-ended agency.
  • Continuity vs tension:
    • Continuity: Team SA’s leveled structure (perception/comprehension/projection) remains useful to diagnose alignment problems and to organize interventions.
    • Tension: The dynamic assumptions (that communication, feedback, and role differentiation will stabilize teaming) are fragile when agents revise goals, generate contestable outputs, or change policy over time.
  • Pathological outcomes identified:
    • Epistemic fragility legitimized: social legitimacy (trust, reliance) may be built on outputs that lack robust grounding.
    • Divergence amplification: iterative human–agent adjustments can feed mutual miscalibration rather than correction.
    • Oversight erosion: shared situational awareness can mask decline in meaningful human control as the agent’s regime drifts.
  • Proposed research agenda highlights:
    • Reconceiving measurement (e.g., projection congruence across heterogeneous cognitive systems).
    • Studying dynamics (longitudinal experiments, field studies, simulations) to observe drift and misalignment over episodes.
    • Designing mechanisms for continuous alignment (transparent grounding, monitoring/auditing, interruptibility, governance protocols).
    • Investigating institutional and market responses (contracting, liability, standards, incentives).

Data & Methods

  • Primary method: conceptual and theoretical analysis.
    • Comprehensive literature synthesis across human–AI teaming, team cognition (Team SA), human–automation interaction, organizational coordination, and explainable AI.
    • Analytical extension of Team SA to account for open-ended agency and three-dimensional structural uncertainty.
    • Mapping of extant theory families onto Team SA levels to identify continuities and boundary conditions.
  • Empirical agenda (proposed, not executed in this paper):
    • Experimental lab studies and longitudinal field studies to observe alignment dynamics across episodes and model updates.
    • Behavioral experiments to measure projection congruence, trust dynamics, and iterative updating effects.
    • Computational/agent-based simulations to explore regime drift, recursive modeling effects, and coordination failure modes.
    • Design-probe evaluations of interface, transparency, and governance interventions (e.g., audit trails, constraint specification, interruption affordances).

Implications for AI Economics

  • Valuation and product-market fit
    • Market value of agentic AI depends not only on immediate performance but on maintainable alignment over time; firms must price in the cost of continuous monitoring, governance, and potential regime drift.
    • Products that favor adaptability (open-ended agency) may command premium only if credible alignment mechanisms exist; otherwise buyers discount due to oversight and liability risk.
  • Contracting and incentives
    • Standard principal–agent contracts assume fixed agent objectives; agentic AI undermines this, requiring dynamic contracts and incentive schemes robust to non-stationary agent behavior (performance metrics, re-negotiation clauses, verifiable audit logs).
    • Moral hazard and information asymmetries increase: providers may update agents in ways that benefit them but deviate from client interests; contracting must incorporate update governance and rollback rights.
  • Organizational design and labor
    • Firms will need new roles and capabilities (continuous AI auditors, governance officers, situational monitors) and may restructure teams around persistent oversight rather than episodic supervision.
    • Labor demand shifts: higher demand for monitoring, interpretability, and governance skills; potential deskilling of routine tasks but increased coordination costs where oversight is costly.
  • Competition and market structure
    • Competitive advantage may hinge on ability to maintain reliable alignment at scale (trustworthiness, explainability, certifiable governance), potentially favoring incumbents who can absorb monitoring costs.
    • Markets for complementary services (auditing, insurance, alignment-as-a-service, verification tools) will expand.
  • Risk, insurance, and externalities
    • Regime uncertainty elevates tail risks (unanticipated objective drift); insurers, regulators, and firms will need new risk models, higher premiums, and capital buffers.
    • Systemic externalities: misaligned agentic AI in widely used infrastructure could propagate errors across firms and sectors, increasing systemic risk.
  • Measurement and productivity accounting
    • Productivity gains are harder to attribute and may be less stable when agentic behavior evolves; macro and firm-level productivity statistics must account for temporal alignment losses and monitoring costs.
  • Policy and regulation
    • Regulatory frameworks should mandate provenance, auditability, and update-disclosure requirements to reduce epistemic and regime uncertainty.
    • Liability regimes must address evolving-agent behaviors; policymakers may need to require fail-safe control points and human override guarantees for critical domains.
  • Empirical economics research opportunities
    • Natural experiments around model updates, platform policy changes, or regulation rollouts can reveal causal effects of regime shifts on firm outcomes.
    • Structural and behavioral models can incorporate non-stationary agent policies to study incentives, innovation rates, and welfare impacts.
    • Market design research can evaluate trading platforms for agentic AI services, contracting primitives, and insurance markets for alignment risk.

Overall, the paper signals that economic models and organizational strategies must internalize the temporal and structural uncertainties of agentic AI—shifting focus from one-off alignment to sustained governance, monitoring, and incentive design over time.

Assessment

Paper Typetheoretical Evidence Strengthn/a — Conceptual/theoretical synthesis without empirical tests or causal identification; claims are logically argued and grounded in cross-disciplinary literature but not supported by new data or causal estimates. Methods Rigormedium — Careful interdisciplinary literature synthesis and clear conceptual distinctions (e.g., projection congruence, continuity vs. tension), plus concrete proposals for metrics and follow-ups; however, the paper lacks formalized models, simulations, or empirical validation to demonstrate the mechanisms or quantify magnitudes. SampleNo empirical sample; a conceptual synthesis drawing on literature from human–AI teaming (HAT), Team Situation Awareness, human factors, multi-agent systems, and AI alignment, with proposed simulation, experimental, field, and econometric follow-ups. Themeshuman_ai_collab org_design governance labor_markets productivity GeneralizabilityConceptual results untested empirically — applicability depends on whether agentic AI with described properties is deployed at scale, May not hold in narrow, well-specified automation contexts where outputs and objectives are bounded, Organizational variation (size, governance capacity, sector) could change costs and feasibility of continuous alignment, Regulatory, cultural, and institutional differences across countries/industries may limit transferability, Assumes certain technical capabilities (evolving objectives, open-ended trajectories) that may not be present in current-generation systems

Claims (22)

ClaimDirectionConfidenceOutcomeDetails
Agentic AI creates a new kind of structural uncertainty for human–AI teaming (HAT). Ai Safety And Ethics negative medium structural uncertainty in human–AI teaming
0.01
Under agentic conditions, alignment cannot be treated as a one-time agreement over bounded outputs; it must be continuously sustained as plans and priorities evolve. Ai Safety And Ethics negative medium alignment persistence / need for continuous re-alignment
0.01
Team Situation Awareness (shared perception, comprehension, projection) remains a useful analytic anchor for HAT even with agentic AI. Team Performance positive high usefulness of Team Situation Awareness as an analytic framework
0.02
Agentic AI undermines key assumptions that shared awareness will reliably stabilize coordinated action over time. Team Performance negative medium stability of coordinated action given shared awareness
0.01
Agentic AI is characterized by three properties that drive structural uncertainty: open-ended action trajectories, generative representations/outputs, and evolving objectives. Ai Safety And Ethics null_result high presence of specified agentic properties
0.02
Behavioral trajectory uncertainty (difficulty predicting long-run actions) is a primary form of uncertainty introduced by agentic AI. Ai Safety And Ethics negative high predictability of long-run agentic AI actions
0.02
Epistemic grounding uncertainty (uncertainty about how/why an AI produced a particular output) increases with agentic AI. Ai Safety And Ethics negative high ability to explain/ground AI outputs
0.02
Governing-logic stability uncertainty (whether decision logic or objectives remain stationary) is a distinct risk posed by agentic AI. Ai Safety And Ethics negative high stability of AI decision logic/objectives over time
0.02
Agreement on bounded outputs (specifications, short-term goals) is insufficient for maintaining alignment with agentic AI. Ai Safety And Ethics negative medium effectiveness of bounded-output alignment strategies
0.01
Projection congruence — alignment of forecasts/plans across heterogeneous agents — becomes a central metric for assessing alignment in agentic human–AI teams. Decision Quality positive medium degree of congruence in projected trajectories between human and AI teammates
0.01
Relational interaction mechanisms (trust, norms, mutual adjustment) can break down when AI objectives diverge or are opaque, reducing effective teaming. Team Performance negative medium strength/stability of trust, norms, and mutual adjustment in HAT
0.01
Human cognitive learning processes (calibration, error-correction) may misalign with agentic AIs because humans and AIs learn from different signals and on different horizons. Ai Safety And Ethics negative medium alignment of learning/calibration processes between humans and AIs
0.01
Coordination and control mechanisms (hierarchies, protocols, monitoring) face scalability and specification problems when agents generate unforeseen actions. Organizational Efficiency negative medium effectiveness/scalability of coordination and control mechanisms
0.01
Principal–agent contracting frameworks must be extended to account for evolving agent objectives and open-ended action spaces; contracts should be dynamic and include continuous renegotiation and monitoring. Governance And Regulation positive medium adequacy of static contracting frameworks vs. proposed dynamic contracts
0.01
Uncertainty about long-run agentic behavior increases option value and downside risk of investing in agentic systems, which may raise discount rates and required returns. Firm Revenue negative low investment valuation metrics (discount rates, required returns) for agentic systems
0.01
Firms will place greater value on alignment-as-a-service, monitoring platforms, and certification/assurance products as agentic systems proliferate. Adoption Rate positive low market demand/value for alignment/monitoring services
0.01
Labor complementarities with agentic AI will shift resources toward oversight, interpretation, and coordination roles rather than routine task execution. Task Allocation positive medium allocation of labor hours/roles toward oversight and coordination tasks
0.01
Agentic systems generate tail risks and endogenous systemic correlations (multiple systems converging on similar failure modes), creating new insurability challenges. Ai Safety And Ethics negative medium frequency/severity of tail events and systemic correlated failures among agentic systems
0.01
Productivity gains from deploying agentic AI may be overstated if alignment costs, monitoring overhead, and coordination inefficiencies are ignored. Firm Productivity negative medium net productivity gains after accounting for alignment/monitoring costs
0.01
Dynamic oversight regimes (ongoing audits, continuous certification) are likely more effective than one-time approvals for managing risks from agentic AI. Governance And Regulation positive low effectiveness of dynamic oversight vs. one-time approvals in maintaining alignment and reducing risk
0.01
The paper proposes specific empirical and analytic follow-ups — multi-agent simulations, lab experiments with humans and adaptive agents, field case studies, econometric analyses, and formal economic models — to test the conceptual claims. Research Productivity null_result high feasibility and design of empirical/analytic methods for studying agentic HAT
0.02
The paper proposes measurable metrics such as projection congruence indices, alignment persistence measures, monitoring/oversight burden, and outcome variability/tail risks attributable to agentic autonomy. Research Productivity null_result high proposed measurement constructs (projection congruence, alignment persistence, monitoring burden, outcome variability)
0.02

Notes